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Abstract—The number of smartphones, tablets, sensors, and
connected wearable devices are rapidly increasing. Today, in
many parts of the globe, the penetration of mobile computers
has overtaken the number of traditional personal computers. This
trend and the always-on nature of these devices have resulted in
increasing concerns over the intrusive nature of these devices and
the privacy risks that they impose on users or those associated
with them. In this paper, we survey the current state of the art
on mobile computing research, focusing on privacy risks and
data leakage effects. We then discuss a number of methods,
recommendations, and ongoing research in limiting the privacy
leakages and associated risks by mobile computing.
Index Terms—Privacy, Mobile Computing, Sensing, Usable
Privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
TODAY, we are surrounded by a powerful combinationof mobile technology and Internet connectivity. Many
of these devices have become our personal assistants and
connectivity gateway to the world. In the past few years,
reduced manufacturing costs and advances in hardware tech-
nologies (e.g. sensors, processors) and software platforms
(e.g. Android, iOS) have made smartphones increasingly more
powerful and popular.
More recently, a new family of mobile devices called wear-
able technology have also appeared in the technology scene.
These devices are designed to be worn on the human body in
an always-on and ubiquitous manner. Some of these devices
have been designed to perform dedicated tasks with the help of
cloud service or mobile phones. However, more sophisticated
devices like Google Glass,1 not only have connectivity and
computational capability much like mobile phones, but also
due to their contextual use and spacial sensing capabilities,
they have a much broader effect on the individuals who are
engaging in using them and those around them.
In this survey we explore and survey the potential privacy
leakages in mobile computing and wearable devices. Our main
contribution is to classify the leakage of privacy and also
provide short summary of the multiple efforts to study, model
and reduce privacy issues in mobile and wearable devices. We
provide insights into current solutions for preserving privacy
in these devices, on various levels.
The rest of this survey is organised as follows: in Section II
we provide a brief introduction to Mobile Computing. In
Section III we provide a summary of conventional methods
1https://www.google.com/glass/start/
used today for characterizing privacy. Section IV presents
a summary of current research on privacy leakage, firstly
through mobile devices, then through apps in Section V,
and lastly mobile advertizing platforms in Section VI. In
Section VIII we discuss mobile sensing methodologies and
their privacy implications. In Section IX we investigate the
characteristics of individuals’ behaviour and their attitude
towards privacy in mobile computing. Finally, we conclude
the paper in Section X and suggest future work in the area
based on the works in current survey.
II. MOBILE COMPUTING
In this section we provide a brief introduction to mobile
computing. Our intention is not to survey the current advances
in mobile computing itself, but to provide adequate funda-
mental information that will help the reader to understand the
details of privacy leakages within the scope of this survey.
Specific aspects of mobile computing and personal mobile de-
vices include: being personal (Not shared), persistent network
connectivity, and mobility (location independence). Advances
in technology have redefined the meaning of mobile com-
puting. Today, mobile computing encapsulates sophisticated
smartphones that are equipped with large processing powers
and various kinds of intelligent sensors. These devices have
operating systems, Internet connectivity, and can run advanced
applications.
Recently new kinds of mobile devices have also emerged.
These devices are similar to their handheld counterparts (i.e.,
smartphones) in features, but users can usually wear these
on their bodies. Additionally, they are designed to seamlessly
interact with the environment and are continuously connected.
The most advanced form of these devices are smart glasses.
They run advanced mobile operating systems and possess
computational capability. Throughout this survey, we use mo-
bile computing to represent smartphones as well as advanced
wearable computers and devices.
III. CHARACTERIZING PRIVACY IN MOBILE
COMPUTING
A. Privacy: Definition
Over the past decade, privacy has gained significant at-
tention in academia as well as in industry. The main reason
behind this interest is the consequences of privacy violation
on individuals. On the one hand, sensitive user data can be
exploited by malicious identities to steal or expose personal
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2information about the users and on the other hand it can
be misused to harm users financially or socially. Moreover,
companies can also use this data to learn sensitive personal
identifiable information about users without their consent and
awareness [1].
Although details of private information can vary, meanings
of privacy have similarities across different contexts. Many
definitions are proposed by the research community to under-
stand the social meaning of privacy. Probably the most precise
explanation of privacy is by Clarke et al. [2]. They explains
that Privacy is the interest that individuals have in sustaining
a ‘personal space’, free from interference by other people
and organizations. Another effective meaning of privacy is
provided by Westin [3]. He views privacy as the claim of
individuals to determine for themselves when, how, and to
what extent information about them is communicated to others.
Privacy is a social notion with many facets. However it
is also related to a wide variety of computing technologies.
As suggested by Langheinrich et al. [4], privacy has different
goals in different contexts, owing to which there can be
no standard definition of privacy in mobile technology. The
following definitions are provided by researchers:
• Montjoye et al. [5] researchers explain privacy as the
guarantee that participants maintain control over the
release of sensitive information that relate to them. This
includes the protection of information that can be inferred
from both the sensor readings themselves and from the
interaction of the users with the participatory sensing
system.
• Shmatikov et al. [6] provide the view of privacy in multi
agent systems. They express that privacy is preserved if
no malicious agent can use the system to learn how other
agents make identity-based decisions.
• Lucas et al. in [7], define privacy as:
– No access to an individual’s personal data without
informed consent;
– Individual’s control over personal information;
– Freedom of the individual from judgment by others.
In order to cater to mobile and wearable devices, we define
privacy through the following characteristics.
B. Individual Consent
Considering the nature of mobile and wearable devices,
individuals are device owners as well as the people surround-
ing the device. Consent here means the degree of agreement
between the user’s awareness about data collection and the
actual data handling by the application. Many surveys have
been carried out to estimate user expectation and awareness
with respect to privacy leaks through their devices [8], [9].
C. Private data
Private data is a piece of information on mobile devices
that includes user privacy. It may consist of any sensitive
data, which can be exploited to get the identity or other
personal information about the user. Examples of such data
may include location coordinates, device ID, contacts, pictures,
video, audio etc [10]. Additionally, it is also possible that
data is not directly sensitive, but analysis can be done on
it to infer personal information. For example, recently many
attempts have been made to use data mining techniques to
infer personal information from raw data streams of various
mobile sensors [11], [12], [13], [14].
D. Prevention: Control and Transparency
Prevention in mobile computing is the balance between
privacy and functionality. Privacy leak prevention in mobile
computing mainly includes anonymity, control and trans-
parency. This has recently been debated in the Privacy-by-
Design framework [15].
Anonymity is the measure of extent, to which certain data
collected and stored by mobile applications can be linked
to the identity of the individuals. Many techniques have
been proposed by the research community to guarantee data
anonymity [16], [17], [18], [19].
Control is the authority of users over data collected about
them. In mobile computing it means that decisions about the
collection, storage and analysis of data are made only by the
owners of data. This may also include control over the removal
of data previously collected. Google has recently provided
users authority over their own search data and allowed them
to remove all data collected about them [20], [21].
Transparency means that users must be aware of how,
when and by whom data about them is collected. This is the
most important characteristic of privacy prevention in mobile
applications, as many free apps include third party advertising
libraries that can collect users’ data silently [22], [23].
IV. SYNOPSIS OF MOBILE PRIVACY RESEARCH
Mobile privacy is often investigated at two levels. The
Operating System (OS) and the application level are of interest
for those looking at issues such as privacy models, data flow,
privacy source and sinks in operating systems, effectiveness
of current privacy solutions and the analysis of users’ atti-
tudes towards privacy. Meanwhile sensors and communication
research looks into privacy leaks through dedicated sensors
on mobile devices, privacy against sensor data inference, and
privacy leaks through mobile communication protocols.
Privacy research in mobile computing is facing many chal-
lenges. Data leaks by malicious applications, personal data
access by ad libraries, the efficacy of operating systems in
protecting data, preventing inference of personal information
through mobile sensors, dangers to anonymity of people
around the device, awareness and understanding of users
for privacy are considered main topics in mobile privacy
research. As mobile devices are getting smarter users can
now enjoy a diverse range of applications and services on
their devices, Mobile social networking, social and location-
based recommendations, mobile e-commerce, mobile health,
and mobile cloud services are few of major applications, which
have become popular among mobile users. These applications
access on-device resources to deliver the required services
to the users. These applications can work simultaneously
in independent or co-operative manner on a mobile device.
Diversity in types of services and their mutual co-operation
have allowed complex privacy leakages. This in turn has led
to poor privacy protection methods and modals. In this section
3we discuss these privacy leakages and the research carried out
in aid of understanding these leakages.
A. Mobile Applications
All advanced mobile OSs - Android [24], Window’s
phone [25] and iOS [26]- provide rich software development
kits(SDKs), which enables application developers and busi-
nesses to implement dynamic applications with ease. These
applications can then be executed on these OSs by running the
dedicated execution cycle. Moreover, these OSs also provide
a permissions model to negotiate the applications’ access to
personal data. Every request for permission is usually linked
to some unique private data. If any application requires the
accessing of data, these permission models usually ask permis-
sion from the users. However, once permission is granted, the
application can then access data associated to that permission
for ever. Besides obvious similarities, the implementation of
permission models and executions cycles in Android and iOS
are different [27].
1) Android
Android is a Linux based OS, its applications are written in
Java and compile to a custom byte code known as Dalvik
byte-code. Each application is executed within the Dalvik
virtual machines (DVM) interpreter instance. Each instance
is executed as a unique user identity to isolate applications
within the Linux platform subsystem. Applications on the
same device can communicate by sending parcels via the
Binder Inter Process Communication(IPC) mechanism [28].
In Android, all the requests to access sensitive data need
to be explicitly included in the application configuration file,
at the time of development. During the installation of the
application, users have to evaluate any requests and grant
the corresponding permissions to continue using the applica-
tion [29].
2) iOS
iOS is built on the open source XNU kernel. Applications
are written in objective C, and apps are loaded directly by
the kernel level loader. The loader interprets the binary and
loads its text and data segments, and jumps to the app entry
point [30].
Additionally unlike Android, in iOS there is no concept of
explicit permissions and requests. At the time of installation
users are not asked for any permission. However, while using,
if an application wants to access any personal data, users are
asked permissions. In this case users can grant or reject few
particular permissions and continue using the application [31].
These applications are published on dedicated ‘application
stores’, from which general users can download and install
them on their devices. Developers can earn healthy revenue
from their applications as recent reports have estimated billions
of Dollars as revenue from these markets [32]. However, due
to limited auditing on these markets, applications from them
cannot be fully trusted.
Despite privacy controls, it has been found that third party
applications can still access and leak personal data without the
consent of the users [33]. In addition, a very large proportion
of applications on “application stores” are free of cost. Usu-
ally, developers earn a profit from their free applications by
including third party advertisement libraries. These libraries
can, in turn, access the personal data of users in a hidden
manner [34].Privacy research in mobile OSs therefore focus
on new privacy leaks and methods to detect them [33], [35].
B. Mobile Advertising Libraries
A large portion of mobile applications are free. To get
incentives from these free applications, developers include ads
library in their apps. These ads are incorporated inside the
applications. At the run-time of applications, the ad library
communicate with an ad network’s server to display ads on
the user’s devices. In doing so these libraries may be sending
additional information to the servers without the consent of
the users or sometimes even developers. A very detailed
explanation of ad libraries and their communication with ad
server is provided in [36].
It has been revealed that these ad libraries contain API calls
that can send personal information(users call logs, device IDs,
contacts etc) to the ad servers [37]. Additionally, these libraries
also gain information that is not required for their purposes.
However, this data is significant only when correlated with
other user’s information. For example few ad libraries send
users call log to ad servers, which are not required for target
ad displays. Similarly, it is also found that few libraries send
information such as phone numbers, SMS service provider and
list of installed applications [36].
C. Mobile Connectivity
One of most important feature of mobile computing is
connectivity. Almost all the applications and services that run
on these devices use connectivity to achieve their functionality.
These functions may include accessing websites, making calls,
communicating with other devices, accessing online services
and so on. Modern mobile phones can connect to the internet
or other devices by various means. As shown in Table I these
technologies greatly differentiate from each other in terms
of range, speed of data transfer and main purpose of usage.
Mobile devices are personal to users; therefore, various studies
Technology Speed Range Usage
NFC 424 kbit/s Short(<20cm) P2P comm.
Bluetooth 2.1 Mbit/s Short(<20ft) P2P comm.
WiFi 600 Mbit/s Medium(<46m) Internet
Cellular 129 Mbit/s Long (>40km) Voice,Internet
TABLE I: Mobile Connectivity Technologies
have been contributed by research community, which high-
lights that personal information can be extracted by analyzing
data feeds from these connectivity technologies in mobile
devices [38], [39], [40]. These studies are based on a range of
data either collected directly from the network companies(call
data records, location histories, network packets) or sniffed
data by eavesdropping on the network.
4D. Mobile Sensing
Sensors enable mobile devices to become aware of the
context by providing new dimensions of data. With the ad-
vancement in sensor technologies, newer mobile devices are
being equipped with new sensors.
Few privacy sensitive sensors in mobile devices and direct
data they extract are:
• Camera: video and images
• Biometric: finger printing, iris imaging
• GPS: location
• Accelerometer and Gyroscope: motion, activity
• WiFi, NFC, Bluetooth: presence of users
• Touch: touch pattern
A growing number of advanced applications are now avail-
able to users that use large amount of sensors data from mobile
devices to provide a variety of services to the users. The
following are a few recent advanced sensor-based applications
currently available in App Stores.
• CarSafe [41] is an application that learns the driving
behaviors of users by using the two cameras in a the
smart phone.
• Nike+ [42] and Adidas miCoach [43] are fitness appli-
cations. They track user’s activities (route, pace and time)
by using GPS and other sensors on mobile devices. This
data app also offers personalized coaching to users to
improve their running ability.
• StudentLife [44] uses sensing data from the phone to
detect the mental health, performance and behavioral
trends of the students.
• NameTage [45] is the first real time facial recognition app
for Google Glass. It allows users to capture images from
their live video and scan them against photos from social
media and dating sites, including more than 450,000 sex
offenders.
• AutoSense [46] is an experimental sensing application,
which uses sensors to record physiological data and uses
it to understand the psychological state of the user in real
time.
• GasMobile [47] is a paticipatory mobile application
for air quality monitoring. It allows users to monitor,
visualize and share the information about the air quality.
These applications have gone beyond raw location based
services and provide a completely new dynamic meaning to
the context of the user.
As suggested in [48], [49] current privacy controls in
the mobile applications are static and therefore they cannot
guarantee satisfactory privacy preservation against dynamic
context aware applications. Usually these controls ask users
to make decisions regarding sensor data. This approach has
limitations in a way that they do not provide the user with any
information about how the sensor data is captured and used.
In summary, the large availability of sensor data and context-
aware applications raise new kinds of privacy concerns that
are not obvious to the users. Therefore, it is highly important
to enhance OSs’ privacy models to able to protect the privacy
of users against dynamic context aware applications.
E. User attitudes
Privacy solutions in mobile OSs request users’ permission.
Many users claim to understand privacy issues in mobile
devices, yet studies reveal large amounts of personal data
are being released by them through these devices. It has
been found that mobile users cannot fully understand and
evaluate these permission requests or the contextual value
of their personal information [50]. Owing to this, they are
granting permissions to applications that can later harm their
privacy [9]. Besides a lack of understanding, other factors also
harm mobile users’ decisions about the sharing of data. Pedro
et al. [51] have listed factors, which have significant influences
on user’s behavior towards privacy
• Importance of the type of information;
• Retention period of data;
• Usage of collected information;
• Access and control over collected data;
• Familiarity and recommendation by friends.
Designing privacy protection solutions, which take into
account these all factors, is a challenging task. For example:
solution must take into account privacy preferences of individ-
ual users to be effective. Application developers have to make
sure to provide users access to collected data. The numerous
challenges in designing these solutions have led researchers
to evaluate users’ behavior and expectations. In Section V we
discuss some of the issues involved in privacy of applications.
V. PRIVACY DETECTION: METHODS AND TOOLS
The research community has contributed a lot of work
to analyze and track how applications leaks private data. A
plethora of tools have also developed, which inspect appli-
cations for potential privacy leaks. In this section, we first
provide preliminary concepts that are important to understand
these privacy-monitoring tools. Secondly, we highlight several
methodologies followed by them to detect privacy. Finally, we
include case studies of some of these tools and privacy leakage
detected by them through mobile applications. The aim of this
section is to give users an overview of the current and future
research in privacy detection tools. Therefore, this section
do not provide details about the implementation of these
frameworks. Furthermore, [52], [53]and [54] have extensively
discussed the technical details of these tools and readers may
refer to them for further understanding.
A. Preliminary Concepts
Data Flow Analysis: Data Flow Analysis(DFA) technique
is very popular to track the flow of sensitive information. This
technique is dependent on the source and sink of the data.
On a higher level, this technique looks for routes between
data sources and sinks in mobile OSs as applications run
within them. Data sources are sources of sensitive data such
as location, file, database and contacts. While data sinks are
points that can leak out or leave the mobile device such as
the internet or any other mechanism that transmits data out of
the system. Any flow of data from source to sink without the
user’s consent can be classified as privacy leakage [52], [53].
Typical sources and sinks for mobile devices as given in [55]
are included in Table II and Table III.
5Inter-Component Communication: Applications are com-
posed of several components, which may include parts of sim-
ilar or different applications. For example, some components
of Android application are;
• Activity - controls UI screens
• Service - background processes not tied to UI
• Content Provider - provides read, write and update
operations on app data
• Broadcast Receiver - receives messages from Android
app framework
These components can communicate through objects (like
intents). Inter-Component Communication (ICC) can occur
either within a single application or across applications [56].
Capability Leak: A capability leak occurs when a ma-
licious app gains access to data by hijacking permissions
granted to trustworthy apps without itself requesting them. As
mentioned in [57], capability leaks can be explicit or implicit.
Explicit capability is leaked if the public interface (entry point)
of the application exposes capability, which can be exploited
or invoked by other unrelated application. While implicit
capability is related to internal variables in the setup file of the
application. For example, in Android variable ‘sharedUserId’
allows apps developed by one developer to have the same
User ID. Permissions are granted based on the User IDs of
the applications; therefore all applications that share the same
User ID gain permission collectively.
B. Privacy Detection Methods
In the following we have provided some common methods
adopted by privacy detection tools.
1) Dynamic Analysis
Dynamic analysis monitors the behavior of applications
to identify privacy leaks as they are executed. In dynamic
analysis, the focus is on how the program or application per-
forms on a sensitive input data. By performing DFA through
the system, users can be warned about any potential privacy
leak through their devices. However, dynamic analysis tools
require the actual device or emulator to perform the analysis.
Moreover, these tools also have performance overheads as real
time analysis of the application is performed [58].
Figure 1 shows the architecture of Taintdroid [35], a dy-
namic tool to detect inter application data flow privacy leaks.
Information is tainted (1) in the trust application. The taint
interface stores specified tag markings in a virtual taint map
and also interfaces (2) with Dalvik Vm. The Dalvik VM
propagates (3) taint tags as applications use the information
included. When a trusted application uses a modified IPC
library (4), taint tags are included in the parcel with infor-
mation and is transferred (5) through kernel transparently to
untrustworthy application. At receiving end, the modified IPC
library removes taint tags from the parcel and assigns(6) it to
all values using the map and Dalvik VM propagates (7) these
tags to the application. When an untrustworthy application
invokes taint sink library (8), it retrieves tags from the data
and reports the event (9).
Fig. 1: TaintDroid Architecture
Fig. 2: LeakMiner Architecture
2) Static analysis
The static analysis approach tries to cover all possible
execution paths of the program. The complete code is statically
analyzed without need of its execution, then the control
flow graph(CFG) of program is created. The CFG is used
to trace the flow of sensitive information from sources to
sinks. Modern static analyzers convert programs code into
some intermediate representations, which can be effectively
processed to generate CFGs. Static analysis takes more time to
analyze the program than dynamic analysis as it processes the
complete code and all execution paths. However, it has no real
time performance overhead, as processing is done statically
before the code is actually executed [53].
In figure 2 the architecture of one static analysis tool
LeakMiner [59] is given. As mentioned earlier, Android ap-
plications are executed in Dalvik byte-code. Therefore this
tool first converts byte-code back to Java code and extracts
the Meta data of the application, such as permissions, to help
identify sensitive data. Using this Meta data, the system then
filters relevant API calls. The data flow analysis technique is
used to form control flow graph of all instructions and data
points dependent on these API calls. If these data points are
propagated over the network or logged, a leak path is identified
and reported.
3) Hybrid
A hybrid approach combines static and dynamic analysis to
improve the privacy leak detection. In figure 3 an overview of
hybrid privacy detection tool, SmartDroid [60] is shown. At
higher level, it implements static path selector, which utilizes
static analysis to extract expected activity switching paths by
analyzing activity and function CFGs. The dynamic UI trigger
then traverses each UI element to reveal privacy sensitive
6Fig. 3: SmartDroid Architecture
Fig. 4: Paranoid Android Architecture
trigger conditions according to these activity switching paths.
4) Cloud Based Analysis
Mobile devices are severely restricted in resources, due to
which performing privacy detection on them can be prob-
lematic. Research community therefore proposes a new cloud
based model that devolves privacy detection from mobile
devices.
An architecture of one such tool named Paranoid An-
droid [61] is illustrated in the figure 4. At higher level,
it includes running a synchronized replica of the phone on
cloud based server. Since server does not have mobile device
like constraints, privacy detection analysis that would be too
complex to run on mobile devices can be performed. A Tracer,
in a mobile device, collects all necessary information required
to re-perform mobile application executions. The tracer then
transmits this information over encrypted channel to cloud
based Replayer that re-executes application in the smart-phone
emulator. Afterwards, privacy checks within the emulator can
be performed on the server.
5) Others
In the following, we provide a few other methods used by
research community to improve the detection of privacy leaks
by applications:
• User’s Comments Based - Rather than analyzing appli-
cation itself, this method is based on user’s comments
about the applications. The dataset of users’ comments
can be collected from official ‘app stores’. Afterwards,
various privacy labels are used to classify privacy related
Sources
Location Data: GPS, last base station location, WLAN
Unique,Identifiers: IMEI, IMSI
Authentication,Data: Cashed password data
Contact and Calendar, Contacts, address and schedule
Call State, Start and end of incoming call, number of incoming call
TABLE II: Sensitive Data Sources
comments [62].
• Machine Learning Based - The fundamental principal
of dynamic, static and hybrid analysis is to detect the
potential flow between sources and sinks. However, most
of these methods require fixed list of these sources
and sinks as inputs. Recently, research community have
proposed an approach that utilize supervised machine
learning to automatically generate the list of sources and
sinks by analyzing complete application source code [63].
• Mobile Privacy Forensic - Current privacy detection
approaches report leaked private data, but provide limited
information about the cause of these leaks. As a result,
users are unable to understand the authenticity of the leak.
This approach therefore attempts to identify the cause of
privacy leak by correlating user actions to leaks [64].
• Crowd Sourcing - In order to determine vulnerabili-
ties in the applications, some of the tools also utilize
crowd-sourcing. Crowdroid [65] uses crowd sourcing to
distinguish trustworthy applications from untrustworthy
ones having the same names and versions. The use of
crowd sourcing provides researchers the behavior traces
from different executions of the same application. These
traces are then compared to identify a malicious copy of
application from the normal one.
• Privacy Prevention - Other than monitoring privacy
leakages, a few recent tools also provide users the ability
to protect against any leakage of private data. This is done
by providing fake or bogus data when it is requested by
malicious applications. Hornyack et al. [66] developed
the AppFence tool to block sensitive information leakage
using the dynamic taint analysis approach. It implements
two techniques: data shadowing and exfiltration block-
ing to restrict applications from leaking sensitive data.
Shadowing substitutes shadow data in place of sensitive
data to prevent it from exposure and ex-filtration and
blocks any network transmission that is carrying sensitive
information. Similarly, Mockdroid [67] and TISSA [68]
also allow users to send fake or mock data to applica-
tions. Although providing fake data can affect some part
of application functionality, it allows users a trade-off
mechanism between privacy and functionality.
C. Privacy Leaks Analysis: Case studies
In this section we have highlighted some of the tools for
privacy leak analysis. In addition, we have summarized a list of
similar tools in Table IV. ScanDAL [69] : This tool performs
DFA using static analysis to detect privacy leaks. It converts
Dalvik bytecode of Android application packages to a formally
7Sinks
SMS, Communication: data can be transferred by SMS
File Output: Applications can write data to files that are globally readable
Network: Applications can access network by sockets or HTTP
Intents, objects: applications can send data objects to other apps
Content, Resolver Apps can use API to edit shared memory of device
TABLE III: Sensitive Data Leaks
defined intermediate language. Dangerous flows are detected
using abstract interpretations. ScanDal has analyzed almost 90
free applications out of which 11 were found to leak sensitive
data. It has also been found that these applications leaks
location data to remote advertisement servers such as AdMob
and AdSenseSpec. Moreover, location and phone IMEI is also
sent to their application servers by the applications themselves.
Appintent [70]: Static evaluations were performed on top of
1,000 Android free applications, out of which 248 apps were
found to leak some kind of sensitive data. This includes device
ID, phone info, location, contacts and SMSs. Researchers also
found that many free applications on the Android market still
transmit data without the user’s awareness; especially mobile
social networking applications or applications that integrate
ad libraries. On the other hand, it is found that malicious
applications also silently leak personal and private data, by
combining it with other data that users are aware of. One
more interesting finding is about trustworthy applications data
logs on devices. Usually these applications log their data onto
local logging files in device storage. It is found that sensitive
information such as Sim number, device IDs, locations and
even contacts are stored temporarily in these files. This logged
data can be acquired by malicious applications, hence result
in privacy leaks.
PCLeaks [71]: This tool analyze ICC to detect any potential
capability leaks. PCLeaks performed a large scale experiment
on 2000 applications. It has been found that large number
of applications pose potential capability leaks. Two kinds
of component leaks have been found: the potential passive
component leak(PPCL), which starts at the entry point of the
Android component and ends on the sink. Potential active
component leaks(PPAL), starts at the data source and ends at
the exiting point of the components. As a result, 43 apps were
found to have 143 PACLs, while 147 apps have 843 PPCLs.
AndroidLeaks [57]: A very extensive study has been
carried out on a large scale on privacy leakage in applications.
Almost 7,870 unique leaks have been found from 7,414
Android applications. The most interesting finding is that 63%
of these leaks were due to the ad codes in the applications.
WoodPecker [72]: As mentioned earlier, Wookpecker tool
analyze ICC to detect the capability leaks of the applications.
Researchers have used various devices from different manufac-
turers to detect capability leaks by pre-installed applications.
These manufacturers include Google, HTC, Motorola and
Samsung. Evaluations have revealed that all pre-loaded apps
possess capability leaks.
PiOS [33]: This tool deals with tracking private data leaks
in IOS devices. Analysis has been performed on 1,407 IOS
applications. It is found that 657 of these applications include
one or more ad or tracking library codes in them. Static
analysis looks for all calls to function named ‘objc msgSend’,
which is a data transmission function. Through tracking for
this function it is found that almost all applications transmit
device ID to third party ad libraries and tracking libraries.
Additionally, it is also found that applications themselves leak
device IDs , location, address books, phone numbers, Safari
history and even photos.
Kynoid [73]: This tool enhances Taintdorid and introduces
fine grained security permission for individual data items. It
is novel in the way that it allows users to specify spatial and
temporal constraints on particular data items and restricting
the destinations in which they can distribute.
VI. MOBILE ADVERTISEMENT
In this section we highlight the few privacy concerns unique
to mobile ad libraries.
• Lack of Transparency Since mobile ad libraries are
incorporated inside host applications, they inherit all
the permissions granted to these applications. Therefore,
mobile platforms for permission based privacy modals as
explained before, are limited in predicting which entity
will use these permissions [36]. Moreover, application
developers and ad libraries do not promote such practices.
Advertisers want information from these permissions to
create better user profiles to then better target them with
ads [80], [81].
• Undocumented Permissions Most ad libraries require
the same set of permissions, however few of them also
attempt to acquire more privileged undocumented permis-
sion. Although none of these permissions are required
for the efficient display of ads, many of them can be
used to create more complete user profiles. Since these
permissions are not documented, developers are not aware
of them and hence applications themselves can be con-
sidered malicious rather than the library [82].
• JavaScript Interface Few ad libraries integrate the
JavaScript interface, which allows for the dynamic exe-
cution of external codes at the run-time. Usually these
interfaces expose functionality like making calls, sending
SMSs and emailing messages, adding calendar entries,
finding locations and making arbitrary network requests.
If an adversary is able to inject malicious code into these
interfaces then he can perform these operations on any
device running particular ad library [82].
• Tracking Multiple applications in the device integrate
code from same ad library. Almost all these ad libraries
are found to transmit certain kinds of unique device iden-
tifiers such as device ID, over the network to their server.
These identifiers are particular to the device and can
allow malicious ad server to track users across different
applications. Moreover, they also provide ground for a
network sniffer to track users activities across different
ad libraries by mapping the unique identifiers of each
device transmitted by different ad libraries [80].
• Increase in Permissions Usage Numbers of studies have
revealed that ad libraries use the permissions assigned to
applications. However, it has also been found that these
8Tools/Frameworks Platform Technique No. of
Tested
Apps
Year Summary
Scandal [69] Android Static Data Flow 90 2011 It is found that 6 applications leak locations to advertisement servers,
5 applications leak locations to analytics server and 1 application leak
IMEI to their server.
PiOS [33] iOS Static Data Flow 1,407 2011 It is found that 656 applications use ad library code which leak device
ID, 195 distinct applications leak Device ID, 36 applications leak GPS
location, 5 applications leak address book information and 1 application
leak browser history and photo storage
ProtectMyPrivacy [74] iOS Crowdsourcing 685 2013 It is found that 48.43% applications access Identifier of device, 13.27%
access locations, 6.22% access contacts and 1.62% access music library
AppIntent [70] Android Static Data Flow 1,000 2013 It is found that 140 apps have potential data leaks, 26 apps leaks data
unintentionally, 24 apps leaks Device ID, 1 app leaks contacts and 1
app leaks SMS
AndroidLeaks [75] Android Static Data Flow 25,976 2012 Approximately 57,299 leaks are found in applications; 63.51% leaks
are found in ad code. Moreover, 92% leaks are related to phone data,
5.94% leaks are of location data and 0.46 and 0.61% leaks of wiFi and
audio
Woodpecker [57] Android Capability Leaks 953 2012 Explicit capability(permission) leaks are found in trustworthy applica-
tions.
Mobile Forensics
of Privacy
Leaks [76]
Android Correlate User
actions to leaks/
dynamic data
flow
226 2012 It is found that 9 different kinds of data is leaked by applications, 34
apps leaks data due to user actions on widgets, 14 leak on start up and
21 leak data on periodic fraction
DroidTest [77] Android Dynamic Data
flow
50 2013 It is found that most apps leaks model number, subscriber ID, mobile
number
IccTA [78] Android Static intra com-
ponent Analysis
3,000 2014 It is found that 425 applications leaks information directly. Thees leaks
are related to device and location data.
TISSA [68] Android Dynamic data
Flow
24 2010 It is found that 14 apps leak location and 13 leaks device ID.
PCLeaks [71] Android Static intra Com-
ponent analysis
2,000 2010 Nearly 986 component leaks are found. While 534 activity launch leaks
are found. Moreover, broadcast injection leaks are 245 and activity
hijacking leaks are 110. Additionally, service launch leaks are 64.
IntentFuzzer [79] Android Dynamic
Capability leak
2,183 2014 It is found that more than 50% of applications leak capabilities or
permissions related to network state, phone state, location and internet
connection.
Leakminer [59] Android Static Data Flow 1750 2012 It is found that 127 apps leaks device ID, 50 apps leaks phone info, 27
apps leaks Location and 12 apps leaks contacts.
TABLE IV: Privacy Leak Detection Frameworks
ad libraries are increasingly taking advantage of these
permissions. In other words research has revealed that
there is a steady growth in usage of privacy sensitive
permission by ad libraries [83].
VII. MOBILE CONNECTIVITY
In this section we briefly explain different connectivity tech-
nologies available in mobile devices, moreover we also provide
case studies of privacy leaks through these technologies.
A. Cellular Technology
Cellular technology allow mobile devices to access the
internet plus communicate with other mobile devices through
voice communications [84]. A typical GSM system and its
building blocks are shown in Figure 5.
1) Preliminary Concepts
Prior to going into the details of privacy leak studies, we
provide brief details of core concepts related to cellular mobile
networks.
Architecture and Components : As mentioned in [85]
there are 15 main components of this network, however only
three of them relate to this survey:
• Mobile Station(MS) - interacts with the nearest located
base stations(BTS) in the cellular network.
• Base Tower Stations(BTS) - circulate the data through
multiple components of cellular networks to reach their
destinations. Interaction between MS and BTS is through
wireless protocol that is also called Air Interface.
• Home location register(HLR) and visitor location
register(VLR) - contain entries for areas of that MS
roams in and out and temporary IDs(TMSI) of MS.
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Protocol for Data Flow: To protect being detected by
eavesdropper, mobile phones communicate over cellular net-
works using temporary identifiers (TMSIs) rather than their
long term identifiers (IMSIs). To cater unsuitability, the net-
works periodically update these identifiers. Other than this, the
technical procedure for flow of data on cellular networks is as
follows:
• Paging Request- A mobile network attempts to find
the MS. The last BTS that has seen the MS, sends
a broadcast message with MS’s temporary (IMSI) or
permanent (TMSI) ID.
• Channeling - When the MS receives this request, it
matches the ID with its own ID. If it matches, MS
requests radio resources from its BTS.
• Assignment - BTS will assign resources to MS, and
immediately send an assignment message.
• Paging Response- MS replies over the resources assigned
to it. Later, the protocol allows MS and BTS to set up
different parameters and communicate through data.
In [40] researchers have provided a very extensive ex-
planation of cellular protocols and channels associated to
them. Moreover, the initial protocols described above are also
summarized in Figure 6. It should be noted that both paging
requests and assignment messages are sent over the broadcast
channels with identifiers so that MSs can match their own IDs.
Furthermore, BTs send paging requests only for MSs, which
are nearby.
2) A Surveillance Technology
As mentioned earlier location data in cellular system is
stored in HLR and VLR. HLR is very big database that
contains profile information of all the devices on the network.
On the other hand VLR is local data repository within BST,
it contains profiles of MSs near to BST. This may also
includes roaming or users of other network. In addition, HLRs
also contains most recent tower ID for each device. This
information is kept to efficiently route a data and calls towards
particular device. Furthermore, cellular systems also keep track
Fig. 6: Cellular Protocol
of sectoring (dividing area of each base station into sectors
and record most recent sector for each device) and radio
signal strength information(RSSI) of each device. One more
interesting aspect is that this data is collected and stored for
a long period. Moreover , cellular network providers also
maintain the mapping between TMSI and IMSI. Clearly, the
surveillance ability of the cellular network is evident from
these facts. Data from the HLR and VLR alone can be use
to track users at the level of BTS. Additionally secotring and
RSSI can make finer tracking possible [86].
3) Privacy Leaks: Case studies
Like other parts, in this section we again first look at
case studies of leaks found by different researchers. Later we
summarize these privacy leaks.
• In [87] Triukose et al. has looked at the feasibility of
using IP addresses in cellular data networks to geolocate
them. Their data-set includes GPS based data of 29,000
cellular IP addresses in 50 different countries. It is found
that mobile networks assign IP address on country level
granularity. Furthermore, by experiments, the spatial loca-
tion of 70% mobile devices were determined with an error
of around 70km. Similarly, in [88] researchers showed
that by using machines learning clustering techniques
geo-location through IP address of mobile devices can
be improved. They utilize the naive bayes algorithm that
assigns a given IP target to a geographic partition based
on a set of measurements associated with that IP target.
Through experiments, they were able to determine the
location of 96% mobile devices with an error of 50 km.
• Another privacy leak in cellular networks is investigated
by Mulder et al [89]. They found that as MSs roam
around and register themselves with BTSs, it is possible
to identify mobile users from these records and pre- ex-
isting location profiles. Moreover, experiments conducted
by them identify 80% of users in the network data-set.
• Similarly, another potential privacy issue has been an-
alyzed by Xia et al. [39]. They found that information
leaked through networks are fine-grained and also dy-
namic. It is easier to map users cyber and real world
activities by combining data extracted from HTTP head-
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ers collected from mobile device traffic and online public
profile of users. They were also able to extract shopping
behavior and the interest of users by collecting visiting
websites names from the cellular network data.
• In addition to tracking users through data recorded by
the network providers, the network interface itself can
allow silent listening attacks and privacy leaks. A study
conducted by Kune et al [40] has shown that there is
enough information leaking from cellular communication
to enable an attacker to perform location tracking on a
victim’s device.
B. WiFi
WiFi technology has been available for more than a decade.
It is a preferred mode to access internet on mobile devices.
It is a short range technology and used mainly in public
places and houses. Following are the basic elements of WiFi
connectivity [90]:
• Access Point - an internet connected wireless router,
which can connect to mobile devices through WiFi signal.
• Hot Spot - an area with accessible WiFi network. This
network can be public (allow any mobile device in the
vicinity of hot-spot to connect without authentication) or
private (requires authentication).
• Connection Mechanism - access points broadcast ‘hello
messages’ to any device in the vicinity of hot spot. On
other side, an individual device can detect these messages
and connect to a particular access point.
However, these WiFi networks are not secure. Data is not
encrypted, which puts personal data at risk of being sniffed
by eavesdropper while using these services. Moreover, a ma-
licious access point can record unencrypted data sent through
it [91]. Security researchers have focused on security threats
and solutions in Wi-Fi networks [92], [93].
• In [92] researchers have revealed the fact that WLAN
fingerprints can be used to infer social relation between
the users. This can be achieved by measuring similarity
between the WiFi fingerprints of the devices. Moreover,
since mobile devices broadcast their Wi-Fi information
that contain devise ID or MAC address, it is possible
for adversaries to actually track locations of devices and
users.
• Zero networking is another terminology, which is famous
for mobile Wi-Fi networking. The main goal of this
networking is to facilitate users to seamlessly connect
to devices and services. Devices names are transmitted
in this networking protocol to ease the discovery and
connection setup of nearby devices. In [94] researchers
highlighted privacy risks associated with the use of de-
vice names in public zero mobile networks, as results
revealed that many device names are actually the names
of the users. Once users and device have been linked, an
individual behavior profile of the user can be created.
• Similar to other research, the researchers in [93] found
that user name is the most conspicuous user privacy being
leaked. Moreover, it is revealed that users’ names can also
be detected by analyzing applications, websites and ad
content in traffic data through WiFi hot-spots. Since most
of the websites and ad libraries store their own resources
in files, the websites content can be reached by combining
host URL, directory and file name in HTTP protocols.
• In another study [95] rather than network data, re-
searchers focus on sensitive information about a device
can be accessed by applications through the WiFi inter-
face implemented in these devices. In other words what
kind of data applications can be acquired or inferred about
devices by calling functions, which are part of a WiFi
interface. Their findings are as follows:
1) By having WiFi connection info, applications can get
the MAC address of devices, which is a unique ID.
Since this ID is permanent, it allows third parties to
track users.
2) Applications can also learn about the last scanned list
of WiFi hot spots around the device. This information
includes MAC address, name, signal strength, operat-
ing channels and so on. This information can later be
geo-locate user positions.
3) It is also possible for applications to determine config-
ured network lists on devices. Moreover, by comparing
these lists, social relationship between individuals can
also be inferred, such as professional, family, interest
groups and the like.
In summary, researchers have highlighted various privacy
concerns related to WiFi connectivity of mobile devices. These
concerns include identity exposure and location tracking by
using device MAC address and the name of the device.
Additionally, social relations among users can also be inferred
by comparing their configured networks lists. Moreover, WiFi
interfaces are implemented poorly, as is reflected by number
of applications that are able to exploit them to access sensitive
data.
VIII. MOBILE SENSING
In this section we focus on technologies and applications
that utilize mobile sensors. Many of these technologies are
mature and are included in our daily life. Moreover, due to
advancements in mobile sensors, new technologies have also
become part of the mobile computing paradigm. However,
studies have also revealed privacy concerns that have been
raised by these technologies. In most mobile devices, user-
based permissions are associated with each sensor. However,
the leakage of sensor data is exacerbated as the public is
often unaware of what can be inferred from seemingly harm-
less data [96] and of smart-phone sensing capabilities [97].
Therefore, in this section we first mention users’ privacy
concerns and limitations in mobile sensor data. Consequently,
we explain the privacy risks associated to various technologies
based on these sensors. In the section on users behaviors we
analyze users’ prospects and their understanding of privacy
concerns. Here we specifically talk about concerns relating to
mobile sensors.
A. Users prospects on sensor data
Although continuous sensing enables a wide range of appli-
cations for users, however privacy concerns of users greatly
depend on the type of sensor data collected, for example it
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has been found that users consider data from GPS sensor
to be more sensitive than the data from sensors such as
accelerometer and barometer [98].
Characteristics of the context in which users are sensed
confidentiality requirement of workplace or the perceived
vulnerability of the user also influence users judgment about
sensing technology. Specifically reducing or increasing tem-
poral and geographical context effects privacy concerns for a
variety of contexts and behaviors [97].
Another factor is users’ perception about the value and
importance of functionality that data from particular sensor
can enable. If the perceived value does not outweigh the risk
of sharing then sensing was rejected. The value of sensor data
is perceived by usefulness of functionality to the user and
duration data is sensed [99].
B. Mobile sensor privacy leaks: Case studies:
Before going into detail about mobile sensor technologies
and privacy leaks associated with them. We provide case
studies related to privacy leaks found in raw sensor data.
• A study conducted by Nicholas et al. shows that mobile
sensor data exhibits similar sparsity as non-mobile data-
sets. Therefore, state-of-the-art de-anonymity techniques
can be successfully applied to them. Further, they showed
that even with limited background information about
a user, an adversary can identify and track the user
within an anonymized sensor data set. Moreover, if two
sensor data streams are generated by the same individual,
then a weekly protected data stream can be used to de
anonymize carefully anonymized private data [100].
• Research by Martina et al. try to find identity pattern of
users in their touch sensor usage behavior. Interestingly
they were able to identify users with a probability of
around 80% after just touching ten buttons [101].
• Similarly as mentioned in [102], raw sensor data such
as GPS and temporal can combined to harm location
privacy [103], accelerometers and gyroscopes can be used
to track geographical positions or even infer a user’s
mood [100].
• Research by Dey et al. shows that due to imperfections
in the electro mechanical parts there is diversity in the
behavior of the accelerometer. This diversity is not visible
from a higher level however if features of these imper-
fections are extracted, they result in online fingerprints
that are enough to identify and track the device [104]. In
the same way another study also shows that data from
an accelerometer can be used to identify different users
from the same device [105].
The aforementioned case studies highlight the important fact
that data leaks from sensors can be used to infer very personal
information about the users. The most important role of these
sensors is to provide the context of users to an application
or service. We now introduce context awareness. Here we do
not survey current research on context-awareness, rather we
provide this brief introduction to help readers become more
familiar with this area. Interested users may refer to [106]
and [107] that provide an in-depth study about context aware-
ness in mobile computing.
C. Context awareness:
Researchers have given various definitions of context. For
the purpose of this survey we adopt definition given by
Oyomno et al. [108], which states that context defines any
enriching information about an entity’s prevailing situation,
including, but not limited to its interactions, attributes and
changes to them. This means that context aware applications
have the ability to use mobile sensors to infer personal infor-
mation about users such as their environment, activities and
even more sensitive attributes like state of mind and adaptabil-
ity according to user context. As mentioned in [109], privacy
risks in context-aware applications can exist on multiple levels:
Acquisition: Acquisition means the collection of context
data with the help of a device and its sensors. Each context-
aware application uses a few on devices sensors to collect data
that in later stages enables them to acquire the context of users.
By analyzing the feed of these sensor data, the credentials of
the users can be revealed [110].
Representation: For the purpose of reusability, data from
these sensors is represented in a standard format. This stan-
dardization requires data to be clear and easy to understand,
so that applications can access this standardized data with ease
and prior understanding. However, this reusability sometimes
comes at the price of privacy. Due to an easy to understand
format it becomes easier for malicious applications to access
and alter the data [111].
Inference: Inference is the translation of the raw sensor data
into information about users’ situations, activities, behaviors,
and the like. This is the unique feature of context aware
applications. Static mobile privacy controls are inadequate in
measuring what adversaries can infer from raw sensor data,
which gives rise to potential privacy leaks. These inference
leaks enable adversaries to gain information about user activ-
ities and environments without their consent.
Transmissions: Once acquired and represented, the specific
contextual data is transmitted to consumers for further process-
ing. It can be a central server or other user devices. Trans-
mission of this contextual information also possesses privacy
leaks. An eavesdropper or malicious application can monitor
transmission traffic to profile users and their movements. Other
details of privacy leaks in transmissions are presented in the
network section.
Utilization: Context data is then stored by data consumers
either for a long time in the repositories or short time inside the
devices. Different personally identified information(PII) are
removed from this data before releasing it for different usage.
However, privacy leaks are inherent in this stored data. Main
privacy challenges in this data utilization technique are related
to selection of PII, since the availability of a large number
of sensor traces can be used to identify users. Additionally,
it is assumed that non-PII attributes cannot be linked with
an individual’s identity. However, the presence of auxiliary
information allows adversaries to relate non-PII context data
to the identity of individuals [112].
We have seen that context-aware applications and tech-
nologies possess privacy leaks on multiple levels. Mostly
privacy leaks specific to context aware applications appear at
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the acquisition and interpretation of data. Now we introduce
technologies based on context awareness and their potential
privacy leaks.
D. Location based services
Presence of GPS and various other common sensors in al-
most all mobile devices allow applications to adapt themselves
to the environment and provide users any useful information
that is relevant to the current location of user. This information
may include new-targeted advertising, navigation and recom-
mendations. These location aware applications or technology
are sub-part of context awareness [113]. In addition to direct
location data, another concept coupled with location awareness
is called proximity awareness, meaning mobile devices are
aware of nearby devices. Proximity can be calculated from
location data.
There are various methods through which applications can
get location information: GPS, mobile phone positioning using
network transmission and indoor techniques, which use WiFi
and other sources of data [114]. A lot of research that deals
with privacy leaks in location aware services have been con-
tributed by the research community. Privacy issues proposed in
these works are from data acquisition and data interpretation
stages of context aware applications. In this section, we include
key potential privacy leaks proposed in these research works.
Levijoki et al. [115], proposed that the most important
issue in location aware services is the lack of understanding
of whom the apps are providing the information to and
for what purposes. Additionally, proximity awareness also
raises privacy challenges. Since it allows devices to learn the
proximity of each other, this data can also be exploited to track
the personal daily routines of users. Minch et al [116] proposed
that location based services do not provide knowledge to users
about what data is stored and where. These questions are
highly relevant because of the identity issue and the effect
of any potential future use of the data. Krumm et al. [117]
shows that other than direct analysis, location data can be
used to automatically infer more personal information about
the users. These inference leaks may include using data mining
techniques to determine the identity of user from data even
when it is anonymized [118]. Similarly, the daily routine of
users [119], clustering location points belonging to the same
trajectories [120], predicting the mood of the transportation of
data [121], age, work place and personal habits like smoking
and drinking coffee [122] can also be inferred from location
data.
Freudiger et al. in [123] showed that Location-Based Ser-
vices (LBS) providers are able to uniquely identify users and
accurately profile them based on some location samples ob-
served from the users. Users with a strong routine face higher
privacy risks, especially if their routine does not coincide
with that of others. Lee [124] has shown that the profile
of mobile users can be created by analyzing their location
tracks. Moreover, these profiles can be used to infer social
relationships among the users. Krumm et al. in [125] was
able to identify mobile users on the basis of their location
tracks by using a simple algorithm and a free web service.
Using GPS mobile data from 172 users, they could find each
person’s home location with a median error of around 60
meters. Usman et al. in [126] has demonstrated that GPS
traces can be used to infer numerous traits about the users
by simple algorithms. Jedrzejczyk et al. [127] has shown
that cross referring location data with publically available
information from social network data may lead to full re-
identification of users. Moreover, they also demonstrate that
by using time stamped mobile location traces the significant
locations of a user such as their home, regular patterns in
movement, behavior, and location of the place a user works
can be identified.
To summarize this section, many privacy leaks have been
identified in the literature relating to location aware services.
These leaks range from simple acquisition issues of location
data like when, who, and where data is collected and stored
to inference or interpretation attacks that can result in the
extraction of more identifying information from raw location
traces.
E. Mobile Augmented Reality
Augmented reality technology has gained a great deal of
acceptance in various applications, for example medical, man-
ufacturing and repair, annotation and visualization, robotics,
entertainment and even in the military field. Mobile augmented
reality (MAR) has recently become the most discussed and
researched field in this study of augmented reality. This is
definitely due to the vast availability of mobile and wearable
devices. The main theme of this technology is to overlay
digital information over the real work that can be viewed
from the built-in camera of a device. By doing so MAR has
revolutionized the way in which information is presented to
the users [128].
As suggested in [129] MAR or AR system usually have the
following attributes:
• Combines real and virtual;
• Is interactive in real time;
• Is registered in 3-D.
Moreover, MAR system depends on following components
to perform its functionality:
• A display on which digital content interacting with real
world can be shown.
• Input sensors to collect input information. Camera, mi-
crophone, accelerometer sensors are used mostly.
• Computational and storage power to analyze the input.
• Network connectivity to keep continuously communicat-
ing with application servers.
However the field of MAR has also been studied vastly for
potential privacy leaks. Here we survey privacy concerns in
the field raised by the current literature.
• Surveillance - The most critical privacy issue for a
MAR application is surveillance. MAR applications can
record activities of individuals around the device without
their consent, due to the ‘always on’ nature of these
applications and ability of mobile devices to easily hide.
This can raise privacy concerns for those who do not want
their normal activities to be recorded [130].
• Consent - Another issues is related to consent. Since
MAR applications record data in public places, people
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around the device have no control over their own data.
Current mobile privacy solutions allow mobile users to
represent their consent but no solution has been adopted
for the consent of the surrounding people [131].
• Anonymity - Anonymity is another major privacy is-
sue discussed by the research community. Even though
users have public social network accounts (SNAs) they
still want to stay anonymous while in public. However,
advancements in face recognition algorithms, may allow
these MAR enabled devices to record facial pictures of
any person around them and recognize a person’s identity
by matching his face with his SNA. This issue is recently
backed by Acquisiti et al. [132] who was able to identify
users by taking their photos and matching them with
profile data base using face recognition algorithms [133].
• Inference - Other issues raised by research community
is related to device owners. Since MAR applications can
see what user is watching, this data can be misused by
malicious services to identify very personal information
about users such as daily routine, diet and interests. More-
over, data from MAR applications can also suffer from
inference attacks at a larger level than simple location
data. For example malicious users can infer relationships,
habits, psychological disabilities and so on, about the user
of the device [49].
F. Mobile Health
Usage of mobile sensors has also been widely accepted
in medical health field. Recently mHealth or Mobile Health
foundation is also developed by United Nations Organiza-
tion(UNO). This technology is referred as mHealth. On one
hand it enables physicians and doctors to monitor their patients
remotely on the other hand it allows patients manage their
health in better way with lesser costs. However, privacy issues
in mHealth technology are more serious due to very sensitive
and personal dealing of health data. Privacy threats in mHealth
are discussed in detail by Kotz et al. in [134]. Major privacy
concerns in mHealth technology are as following:
• Identity threats - There is a risk that patient himself
or insider of mHealth system leaks patient’s credentials,
which allow malicious applications to access personal
data related to patient. Moreover, as in the case with loca-
tion data, even anonymized data can be cross referenced
to publicity available data to identify health records of
specific patient [135].
• Consent - Another risk that appears in mHealth appli-
cations is dependent on patient himself. As patients can
control sharing of their data sometimes due to lack of
knowledge and worry, they can leak more than required
data that can be used by malicious applications to infer
personal attributes about the users.
• Disclosure - Since all mHealth applications deal with
very personal and sensitive data so data stored by these
applications have risk. Malicious applications can access
either through network transmission or direct access to
storage, which can results in privacy leaks on very serious
level [136].
G. Mobile Participatory Sensing
Mobile Participatory Sensing (MPS) leverage the power
of millions of personal mobile devices (e.g., smart-phones,
wearable devices, sensor-equipped vehicles, etc,), to collect
sensing data on large scale without the need to deploy thou-
sands of static sensors. In this paradigm, individuals with
sensing and computing devices volunteer to collectively share
data and extract information to measure and map phenomena
of common interest. Most important feature of MPS is the
agreement of nodes to allow their devices to be remotely
tasked and routing of the small tasks among the participating
mobile nodes to achieve the common goal.
Like other mobile sensing technologies it also suffer from
unique privacy issues. A very extensive survey is conducted by
Christin et al. [1], in which they explores the privacy concerns
in mobile participatory sensing. Here, we have summarized
few of these concerns.
• Control of Data - Although several solutions have been
proposed to allow users to control their privacy in particu-
lar sensitive data, but due to multiple context requirement
of MPS tasks it becomes harder for users to specify policy
for each individual data.
• Tasking - As mentioned before, one of most interesting
feature of MPS is that user’s devices can be tasked to
sense the data. However, these tasks can have critical
threats to users privacy as well. For example, a task in
weather sensing MPS application can ask a node to sense
weather at particular location. However, it can also leak
personal data about the user’s mobility and trajectory with
respect to time [137].
Another concern is related to narrow tasking, which
means that any malicious user can create the tasks that
impose strict limitations on participant attributes or device
user is carried. This kind of tasks may reveal private
information about the users of node who accept the task.
For example, a task may allow the adversary to infer the
geographical link between the users [110].
• Data Delivery - In addition to tasking, data reporting
or delivery can also pose issues related to user privacy.
As users in MPS may volunteer to share their data
with central server, however this data can be leaked to
malicious users within the network [137].
• Data Publish - As mentioned previously, sensor data
can be exploited to identify personal information about
the users. In MPS, a huge sensor data is collected
and stored, if this data is anonymized and published to
external entities and organizations, still it can reveal very
personal information about the users [138]. For examples
researchers have shown that completely anonymous data
can be combined with little prior information about the
users to reveal complete entity of the user [139].
IX. USERS BEHAVIORS
In the ecosystem of mobile computing, users have free-
dom to install or use certain applications or services. Their
decisions to use and share data with applications have high
effect on the protection of privacy. Many users claim to
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understand privacy issues in mobile devices, yet studies reveal
large amount of personal data released by them through these
devices. This section therefore provides brief overview of user
concerns and awareness about privacy. In the Appendix, we
have also summarized various users related studies in mobile
privacy. Moreover, it describes factors that influence users to
make privacy harming decisions.
A. User Concerns and Awareness
Several studies have been conducted to understand users’
point of view about mobile privacy: for instance, [140] shows
that most users are concerned about the protection of personal
data in mobile devices. They also oppose practices in which
applications collect their personal information like contacts
or device ID etc. Moreover they also have concerns about
transparency and control of data collection [116]. Some studies
even show that users are more concerned about privacy on their
mobile devices than on their laptops. They also prefer to use
more critical and personal applications like mobile payments
on desktop computers or laptops [141]. However it is also
found that although users are concerned about the privacy
leakage in mobile devices, but they have misunderstanding
about the sharing of data from their devices. In most of the
cases they are not aware of how their data can be used to
breach their privacy [116]. As a result they may also think
privacy as unnecessary abstraction and can make decisions
against it. These conclusions are also supported by results
in [142], which shows that majority of users are aware of
privacy settings of Facebook mobile application but small
proportion of them actually use it.
B. Usability
It means that the usability and functionality of applications
can influence user’s understanding about privacy. Studies have
shown that users can make compromising decisions against
privacy due to their requirement of real time application
usage [143]. They are also lenient about privacy in useful ap-
plications that share more data and are strict if applications are
useless [74]. Which means that they only prefer better privacy
if it does not come at the cost of functionality [144]. Moreover,
their own expectation about usability and the purpose of why
sensitive data is collected also have major impact on their
decisions [50]. Hence it can be concluded that users’ decisions
are directly affected by their expectations and usability of
the applications. If a particular application or service is more
usable for them then they are likely to make a tradeoff for
privacy.
C. Social Aspects
Other people also effect users’ decisions about privacy.
Usually referrals from friends or family, or on-line referrals
are the predominant ways by which users discovered new
applications for their smartphones. Similarly, popularity, and
recommendations from friends also play important role in
decision to use the service [9]. It has been found that initially
users tend to be more conservative about sharing of per-
sonal information with applications. However, as more people
around them share data, they become comfortable and relax
their privacy policies [8]. In summary, users’ decisions, such
as “which application to install?” and “what data to share?”
is highly effected by their social networks.
D. Limitations of privacy solutions
Poor privacy preserving practices by platforms of mobile
devices are also responsible for users’ lack of awareness
and influence their attitude for making privacy breaching
decisions. Current permission models have serious limita-
tions due to which few users read permission requests and
even fewer understand them. Human-readable terms displayed
before installing an application are vague, confusing, and
poorly grouped. This makes it difficult for people, to make
informed decisions when installing new software on their
mobile devices. Largely, these permissions are ignored and
participants instead trust word of mouth, ratings, and Android
market reviews [145].
A study by Kelley et al. also demonstrated that Android
users found it difficult to understand the terms and wording of
the Android permissions [145]. It is also found that users are
not well served by the existing permission architecture [146].
Moreover, they are also not able to make user aware of
specific privacy permissions and their importance [143] [8].
Solutions such as MobiAd [147] prevent direct referral of the
user data to advertisers, hence limiting the exposure of the
individual to unknown advertisers. However these solutions
limit the ability to accurately characterize the success of ad-
campaigns and preventing click-fraud. Despite their limitations
and challenges, these models can make help users make
decisions to protect themselves from obvious data leaks [148].
X. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper we have provided a comprehensive survey of
recent research studies on detection and analysis of privacy
leaks in all aspects of mobile computing. We first provided
an overview of privacy controls implemented in two main
mobile operating systems- Android and iOS. Next we reviewed
a few techniques adopted by research communities to detect
privacy leaks by mobile applications. We also provided a
brief overview of mobile sensing and connectivity. Finally,
we demonstrated the users’ perceptions and views towards
keeping their mobile device data private. in order to motivate
our readers further about actual privacy leaks, we have also
provided case studies of these research studies in each of
above-mentioned dimensions of mobile computing. In the
mobile applications section, our focus has been on detecting
new types of data leaked by applications. We have also
presented ongoing research efforts focusing on improving
current methods to detect and protect these privacy leaks.
A large body of research in mobile connectivity has mainly
focused on preventing new possible threats which can be
performed on current connectivity options such as cellular
and WiFi in mobile devices. Additionally researchers are
also focusing on making these connectivity protocols more
secure. Similarly for mobile sensing, privacy research target
potential personal data which can be inferred by mining
and combining raw data feeds of various sensors existing
on mobile devices. Researchers have also concentrated on
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Fig. 7: Summary of Privacy Research in Mobile Computing
privacy preserving techniques for data collection of mobile
sensors. Furthermore, research community attempts to find
limitations and effectiveness of current privacy controls in
mobile computing. Moreover, researcher are also trying to
narrow the gap between user preferences, cognitive abilities
and privacy controls implementations. In Figure 7 we have
provided an overview of privacy leaks which have been
detected by the research community in the above mentioned
research dimensions.
Future research in privacy controls need an extensive com-
prehensive study to compare different privacy controls sys-
tems. The main challenge has been a lack of control modals
that takes into account users’ cognitive abilities, preferences
and limitations to understand the complex privacy options and
security flaws. It is clear from the research studies that users
are not well served by current privacy controls. Specifically,
the human-readable terms displayed before installing an appli-
cation are at best vague, and at worst confusing, misleading,
jargonized, and poorly grouped. This lack of understanding
makes it difficult for people, from developers to nontechnical
users, to make informed decisions when installing new soft-
ware on their phones. Largely, the permissions are ignored,
with participants instead trusting word of mouth, ratings,
and other users’ reviews. Hence, there is a clear need for
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building better mechanisms for preserving privacy in mobile
systems [149].
Leveraging suggestions of the works surveyed in this pa-
per, we propose a number of recommendations to increase
efficiency of privacy controls: (i) Increased transparencies -
informing users of the source and destination address when
performing sensitive data transfers; (ii) Increased visibility -
informing users which applications actually access what data,
while differentiating foreground and background applications
and exposing hidden features of applications; (iii) Intelligent
Suggestions - developing techniques that use machine learning
to provide suggestions to users on how to refine their policies
based on their own preferences. Research should also be done
on recommending users to share or hide data from particular
applications because of reputations. Additionally, intelligent
privacy leakage control should limit the number to notifica-
tions to users while guaranteeing protection. One possible
way is to classify the notifications as harmful or harmless,
harmless requests should then be granted automatically while
others should require user’s consent; (iv) Inference Attacks
- The control system should inform users about possible
inference attacks which can be done with their data. A simple
example can illustrate this: if an application asks for multiple
sensor feeds at the same time then a user may be notified for
potential data inferred from these sensors; (v) Clarity - privacy
notifications must be precise and clear. Moreover, visuals
warning like privacy widgets can be included in the system
that notifies users about any potential sensor data accessed; (vi)
Accountability - Once permissions are granted to apps, their
behaviors should be analyzed and any anomalous behavior
should be reported to the users.
The list presented here is not conclusive. The fast pace in
mobile computing, wearables, and IoT will no doubt bring
forward a range of new threat models, privacy leakages, and
data trade challenges. We hope that this survey will act as a
point of reference for future app developers, privacy advocates,
and policy makers.
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APPENDIX
Authors/Study Year - Number of Users Feature
Surveyed
Platform Summary
Christopher
Thompson et
al. [150]
2013 - 189 Sources of Infor-
mation leak
Android +iOS 17% users dont understand that background applica-
tions have same ability as foreground. Many users
misunderstood about source of information leaks.
felt et al. [151] 2012 - 308 Effectiveness
of Android
permissions
Android Only 17% users pay attention to permissions during
app installation. Moreover, only 3% users understand
scope and implication of permissions. Permissions of
android are not complete failure nor complete success.
Users’ privacy related opinions should also be shared
with application permissions at installation.
Kelley et al [145] 2012 - 20 Effectiveness
of Android
permissions
Android Participant do not understand the terms used in per-
missions notifications. They highly depend on ratings,
word of mouth, and reviews. Additionally, they are not
aware of of threats and malware applications in android
market.
Balebako et
al [152]
2013 - 19 Perception on Pri-
vacy Leak
Android 13 participants were unaware that data can be shared
for advertisement purpose. They were also unaware of
scope of data sharing in terms of frequency and location
of data.
Chin et al. [153] 2012 - 60 Perception on se-
curity and privacy
iOS+ Android Users are less willing to perform sensitive task (like
banking) on their mobile phones than there laptops.
They are also more concerned about privacy on their
mobile devices than their laptops. Reason for these con-
cerns are: Physical device lost, User interface concerns
and Misconceptions of network connection.
Kyoung et al. [154] 2013 - 129 Effectiveness of
visual privacy
alerts or framing
effect
Android Results suggest that visual representations of privacy
information of apps can influence installation decisions
by smartphone users. Majority of participants com-
mented that they found the privacy rating very helpful
in deciding whether to install an app ,when it was
disclosed visually on the installation page of the app.
King et al. [155] 2013 - 13 User Expectation
about mobile pri-
vacy
Android+iOS Current privacy controls do not full fill users expec-
tations. Many users believe that variety of assurance
structures(such as developers reputation) protect them
from privacy leaks. Users rank SMS, email and pho-
tos more sensitive in terms of privacy than locations
information.
Benenson et
al. [156]
2013 - 506 Privacy risk Per-
ception
Android + iOS iOS users are very less aware of privacy and sensitive
data types on their devices. Similarly they do not have
much concerned about security, while android users are
usually more active in installing security software on
their devices.
Barkhuus et
al. [157]
2003 - 16 Privacy concerns
on location based
services
Multiple Privacy concerns for location tracking are much higher
than position aware services. However, if users find a
service useful than they are willing to share their exact
location to tracking service also.
Braunstein et
al. [9]
2011 - 200 Indirect privacy
survey
Multiple Asking users directly about privacy is not accurate
measure of their privacy attitude as it makes them
think about potential privacy risks explicitly. However
indirect privacy surveys are more better measurement.
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Kelley et al. [158] 2013 - 20 Understand How
user selects apps
Android Users do not understand privacy permissions displayed
to them during app installation. It is suggested that
privacy implications should be included in the main
page of applications and must be clear and simple.
Shklovski et
al. [159]
2014 - 187 User concerns
about privacy
Android+ ios Users concerns about privacy are over ridden by other
factors while installing apps. They have misconceptions
about what data apps can access on their devices. They
are also concerned about unnecessary data leaked to
third part businesses. It is found that 58% individuals
in the study have previously deleted apps due to privacy
concerns.
Felt et al. [160] 2012 - 115 Rank users con-
cerns about mo-
bile devices re-
sources
Multiple Warnings in iOS and android do not consider users
concerns. Locations sharing is mid-level risk, users are
more concerned about contacts, sms, emails, photos,
calls and calendars etc. Moreover they rank particular
data type less private if they have controls to monitor it
themselves e.g turn of location. In addition, they rank
risks involving third parties higher.
Hkkil et al. [161] 2005 - 119 User perception
about privacy
Multiple 85% users consider their mobile phones very private
device. They regard text messages more private than
emails. Since text message are not secured survey
reveals users expectation on using encryption or any
other security means to protect their SMS.
Benisch et al. [162] 2010 - 27 User preferences
of privacy
Symbian 93% users are comfortable sharing their locations with
family and friends, 60% of them with facebook friends,
57% with university community and 36% with advertis-
ers. Its is also found that users have privacy preferences
with multiple dimensions such as when to share, what
to share and with whom to share.
Muslukhov et
al. [143]
2011 - 22 User understand-
ing to security
Multiple Users store sensitive data on their phone and concerned
about it, however they do not take any action for secu-
rity of their data. Pin codes based and password lock
security measures are unusable for them. They believe
that current privacy protection mechanisms require to
much effort from them.
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